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Best Practices of Effective Think TanksThe criteria of effectiveness differ from one policy context to another, and in relation to the mode of evaluation required by primary funding agencies. For instance, many American think tanks adopt as just one indicator of their ‘success’, the amount of column inches of newspaper reportage they receive. By contrast, a foundation may require other indicators of the impact of policy research they fund by asking for evidence that a think tank has ‘engaged with stakeholders’. However, there is also much that can be done with the internal management that contributes to think tank quality. Accordingly, this section first draws up the eight management principles for think tanks developed by Raymond Struyk for think tanks in the transition societies of Central and Eastern Europe (Struyk, 2002). It is followed by some comments about the elusiveness of policy influence with government. 4.1. Management Challenges for Transition State Think Tanks Improving organisational management is as important as raising analytical capacities. Good management and good governance is crucial to the effectiveness of policy institutes. A flawed administrative structure cannot be offset by strong political directives or substituted by the dynamic charismatic leadership of an individual director. In brief, (and using my own nomenclature) the eight principles developed by Struyk (2002) for the “maturing” post-communist think tanks are:
4.1.1 Motivating staff: Staff motivation problems (disinterest, low productivity) impact negatively on think tank operations. Think staff in non-profit civil society think tanks are usually differently motivated to those in the state sector. People attracted to civil society think tanks often want ‘to make a difference’ and are inspired by the particular mission of the organisation. By contrast, a state sector think tank generally offers security of employment and a relatively direct link to government. Working conditions, facilities (computer, internet, access to data, etc) and interesting work content help in attracting and retaining capable analytic staff. Equally important in creating conditions for higher productivity and innovation from researchers are: (i) recognition of individual achievements and their authorship of reports; (ii) clear career grades and opportunities for development; (iii) competititive salaries, compensation and rewards. This entails transparent procedures for performance evaluation and promotion, as well as planning for staff training and professional development. Staff need to keep abreast of international disciplinary debates and methods via courses or conference participation. Encourage staff to publish in Vietnamese and in appropriate circumstances in another international language. Another unavoidable requirement that Vietnamese think tanks will face in the future – sooner or later – is the real necessity of staff to fund-raise and win research grants. This takes time, practice, perseverance and a ‘thick skin’ for when applications are unsuccessful. 4.1.2 Quality Control: It is essential to pay scrupulous attention to quality of think tank products and services. Usually, the best means is to hire and retain highly qualified researchers; that is, staff with PhDs and policy experience to ensure that advice is reputable and relevant. The standard approach in world’s leading institutes to ensure quality is peer review. Best practice is that: “analysis should be factually correct, logically consistent, methodologically sound, grounded in current and historical literature, objective, and written in a way that will be useful to the primary audience” (Struyk, 2002: 65). The conclusions of research and analysis should not be pre-determined. Peer review methods are diverse and can be undertaken internally via in-house seminars, by the think tank research director and/or management team; and externally, via blind refereeing in scientific journals or use of commissioned reviewers. Other matters of quality that make a big difference to funders include: meeting deadlines; effective presentation of results, and practicality of advice and recommendations. RAND has produced internal guidelines of its corporate conceptions of high quality research which can be regarded as an international benchmark (see Appendix 1). 4.1.3 Organisational Innovation: Civil society think tanks are under constant competitive pressure to innovate, renew their work program and develop both new products and new clients. Think tanks supported by the state – either as a unit within a Ministry or a non departmental public body – need their organisational antennae more attuned to political and bureaucratic agendas. Re-evaluating a think tank’s mission statement, developing new work programmes, seeking new clients and diversifying research agendas requires strategic planning. For Vietnamese think tanks, work for donors and national government provides regular and familiar work of policy development, legislative drafting, empirical background studies, program evaluation, etc. Developing new clients in the business sector – such as with banks or foreign companies – presents challenges of diversification of think tank research agendas and products. These clients have different expectations about the kind of research, the speed with which it is delivered and confidentiality of the results. However, the rewards of developing new private sector clients with consultancy contracts include broadening the researcher’s experience, improved efficiency and heightened public profile. 4.1.4 Strong Team Leaders: These go by various titles such as department heads or division managers as the ‘middle management’ of medium to large think tanks. It is the responsibility of senior management – usually the Director – to appoint team leaders to coordinate project work and its marketing, ensure productivity and a positive work environment. In theory, selection of these managers ‘should’ be done on the basis of the candidate having (i) experience and substantive knowledge of the specific policy field and project; (ii) their interpersonal skills as a leader and mentor; (iii) their initiative and sensitivity to client needs; (iv) organisational and management skills; (v) technical sophistication and credentials (PhD.); and (vi) their intellectual creativity. Such attributes are often intangible but contribute to the ‘buzz’, creativeness and dynamism of the research process. The productivity of the entire institute depends on the success of these team leaders. Appointment on the basis of seniority alone, patronage and favouritism, or personal and political connections cultivates a hierarchical environment of directed research and unproductive behaviours. According to Struyk, authoritarian leadership styles persist in the knowledge industries of Asia when international experience has shown that consultative, participatory research processes are more productive (2002: 137; 146). 4.1.5 Boards and Governance: External oversight from highly reputed members in a board of trustees strengthens the governance of an institute as well as its image with external audiences in the foundation world, with business and among international organisations. For governmental institutes, there may no board of trustees in place. Administration, including the hiring and firing of institute directors, is handled by senior bureaucrats in accordance to civil service codes. Instead, an ‘advisory council’ or ‘scientific panel’ may perform some roles of oversight – depending on how frequently it convenes. Similarly, policy institutes based inside universities (such as my own – CPS) may have an academic advisory body, with financial and other administration functions dealt with elsewhere in the echelons of the university. For independent institutes, the board is the essential decision making body to ensure accountability (that is, that the organisation’s resources are properly expended without waste on excessively expensive offices, travel, salaries or activities) and to ensure that the institute maintains its public role. The more mature, academically secure and financial stable an institute, the more that management can be left to institute directors, and the big questions of vision and strategy in the hands of the board. A frequent reality is that boards are dysfunctional: they ‘micro-manage’, they are reactive rather than strategic visionaries; they are distracted by day-to-day management problems instead of setting long term targets, or they become dormant. The most effective advisory boards are small and of diverse composition incorporating a range of experience to aid strategic development of an institute. An independent board of trustees may not be politically feasible for governmental think tanks in Viet Nam. Nevertheless, advisory committees of eminent scholars or practitioners from institutions outside the ministry (such as based in universities or in private bodies) as well as from overseas contribute to the prestige of an organisation. 4.1.6 Structuring Research Staff around ‘stars’ or ‘teams’. There are a number of different models around the world. Some think tanks are noted for the ‘high-flyer’ researchers who often work solo on their own projects with only the assistance of research assistants. The product is usually published under the ‘star’s’ name. This model is one dominant pattern in North America and Western Europe. By contrast, large scale projects, program evaluations etc. that involves field work, statistical analysis or other original data collection often require team work. Commissioned research is often done on a team basis. A further consideration is the balance of full time residential and part-time contract staff and associate researchers. Due to the vicissitudes of funding, many transition state think tanks rely on a core of full time residential staff but draw in associate researchers on a project basis. Generally, there are high fixed costs with maintaining a large number of residential research staff. Such arrangements are usually found in state-supported institutes – as in Viet Nam – or older mainstream think tanks with sizeable endowments. Where competitive pressures impel independent institutes to evaluate continuously the balance of staff among resident, contract and ‘distinguished visitor’ types, there is little incentive or flexibility to do so in state-funded governmental institutes. 4.1.7 Financial Management. For institutes with the security of state funding or a large endowment, financial accountability is an internally driven process. However, to the extent that Vietnamese institutes seek external research funding from business, international donors or becomes partners in international research projects, then it will be necessary to meet the accounting and auditing standards of the donor. This means that an institute must know its own real costs (direct and indirect) and have the technical capacity for financial accountability. 4.1.8 Communication and dissemination of results. Too often the research process ends with the completion of a written document that ends up gathering dust on the bookshelf. Little thought is given to the mechanisms of how to communicate research results to those who would find the information useful, and little consideration is given to packaging the research in different formats so as to have better impact and visibility in policy circles. Research results need to be timely, comprehensible and written in an engaging style. Too often research is ignored because it is presented in a jargon ridden, dry scientific manner. International funders of research are now demanding that strategies for communication or engagement with ‘user groups’ be built into the research process. Instead of reviewing the voluminous literature on ‘bridging research and policy’, there are organisations with excellent web-sites providing practical advice on communications strategies.
‘Knowledge utilisation’ requires budgetary allocation for dissemination and staff training on communication techniques such as how to write policy memos or work with the media. The methods of communication are diverse, but are an essential ingredient in research being heard and becoming influential. In the words of MIER in Malaysia, “think tanks... need to not only think but also talk’. These management principles developed by Struyk (2002) do not represent a fool-proof toolkit or instruction manual. Instead, there are strategic choices to be made by institutes as to how to structure their organisation to best fit their socio-political context and policy niche. 4.2. Image and Reputation: The Reality and Rhetoric of Policy Influence There is a need for realism in planning for policy impact. The routes of access and strategies of influence will vary according to historical and institutional context of a country, and the degree to which a think tank is an ‘insider’ or an ‘outsider’ to policy communities and power holders. Moreover, a distinction needs to be made between the wider societal implications of ‘research relevance’ and the more concise idea of ‘policy influence of research’. Research may have no impact on decision-makers. This does not mean it is of no utility or interest. Other stakeholders – the media, international organisations present in Viet Nam, the business sector, etc – may wish to be informed of research results. They may not be the target audience for the research product – that is, government decision makers – but these institutions can provide an indirect route of influence. A nascent population of private sector institutes or research oriented NGOs could represent competitive pressure on governmental think tanks in the future. At the same time, new opportunities are likely to be afforded as well. NGO research capacity represents opportunity for collaboration and partnership. Should political leaders choose to solicit policy research outside the government or Party structures, these leaders will still need advisors inside government to help interpret and balance such results and absorb the research. In short, there is considerable potential for symbiotic relationships. Another factor of importance is that “policy influence” means different things to different sets of individuals and institutions. Donors may want to see ‘evidence’ of the impact of think tanks in policy developments. This may mean developing a range of indicators of ‘influence’ or ‘policy relevance’:
However, indicators often do not capture the more invisible features of influence that may occur through ‘corridor lobbying’ and professional contacts built over time that develop into relationships of trust allowing ‘insider’ access to policy communities. Patron-client relationships typical of the Chinese system, and the ‘revolving door’ phenomenon of the movement of individuals between government and think tank in Singapore, entail a more intangible and indirect route of influence. An oft forgotten factor of influence is that think tanks produce human capital. This is not only the universitybased institutes involved in providing public policy/management degrees. It is also the policy training and ‘onthe- job’ experience within think tanks that provide individuals with the bureaucratic skills and political contacts to advance a career in government or ‘international development’. Others suggest that policy influence is more long term, atmospheric and subtle. That is, where the culture of debate is altered, or how the ruling ideas and values of a society are fashioned. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to delve into social science debates about the long term ‘enlightenment’ functions of research and analysis (see Weiss, 1992) other than to conclude with a famous quote of John Maynard Keynes:
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