Rebuilding Capital Assets and Infrastructure

Rehabilitation of damaged housing and infrastructure forms the core of the capital expenditure programmes associated with post-tsunami recovery. Donor funding is seen as critical to this task, so funds were sought at donor meetings in May 2005 to meet assessed needs. Public infrastructure rebuilding is expected to be financed almost entirely by foreign donors with multilateral agencies as well as individual countries accepting particular projects for financing. Major communication and transport links have been repaired, at least on a temporary basis. However, in many cases public buildings and other infrastructure, such as bridges, are yet to be fully repaired or rebuilt on a permanent basis, particularly in the North and the East of the country.

Foreign financing is also expected to fund most of the new residential dwellings planned for affected households for whom new houses have been planned; NGOs (including some local NGOs) and private corporate enterprises are expected provide a significant proportion of required finances.

In both cases, actual progress will depend not only on the extent to which promised assistance actually materialises but also on the extent to which funds are able to finance the actual costs of rehabilitation and rebuilding. As will be discussed later, cost escalations and fiscal pressures are likely to place serious question marks over the extent to which reconstruction can be successfully implemented.

6.1 Residential Housing

Both the ADB-JBIC-WB needs assessment and the GOSL assessment presented to the donors in May 2005 identified damage to housing as the single largest source of damage to physical assets (Table 2 [ PDF 254KB | 10 pages ]). Field interviews conducted by the IPS and other organizations have shown that housing is viewed by the displaced families as their main concern, and regaining an acceptable permanent shelter is their priority goal. The housing issue in some detail below both because of its central importance, and also because it highlights some of the main policy concerns that emerge from our analysis.

6.2 Housing and the Buffer Zone

From the very outset, the housing issue was affected by the government announcement in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami that it would enforce a ‘no-build’ coastal buffer zone of 200 metres in the north and east coasts of the country and 100 metres elsewhere. It was announced that residents within the zone would not be permitted to rebuild damaged or destroyed buildings. The larger distance in the north and east was claimed to be justified by the generally more extensive intrusion of the sea on this coast and the higher risk of cyclones on this coastline. In the areas controlled by the LTTE, initial reports suggested that a similar – or even wider – buffer zone would be put into effect.¹⁹ The government promised that for people whose houses within the buffer zone were damaged, new houses would be provided for them, built on lands in reasonable proximity that would be acquired for the purpose.

In the buffer zone where construction was not to be permitted, the TAFREN guidance of 15 March 2005 stated that the government “will identify land closest to the affected village and provide houses to the affected families. As far as possible, the relocation process will attempt to keep communities intact”. The following assistance policy was to apply:

• No reconstruction of houses (partially or fully damaged) will be allowed within the buffer zone.
• All affected households will be provided with a house built with donor assistance on land allocated by the state. Households will not be required to demonstrate ownership to land.(Our emphasis)
• The new homes will be built in line with guidelines issued by the UDA and will have a floor area of 500 sq. ft. and would be provided with electricity, running water, sanitation and drainage facilities.
• The proposed houses in urban and rural settlements will have facilities such as road systems, recreation, etc.

Owners of damaged houses were to be allowed to keep their land for agriculture and would be offered free land and houses at an alternative site. Undamaged houses and hotels (even if damaged) would be allowed to remain in the buffer zone. For residents within the buffer zone, the government planned to assist not only landowners, but all residents (including encroachers) with some form of housing. This was estimated to require around 50,000 permanent houses.

For those whose damaged houses were located outside the buffer zone, the government agreed to provide grants and loans for households outside the buffer zone to rebuild in the same place. The grants are provided through the state banks with funding from donor agencies. According to TAFREN guidance of 15 March 2005, the following criterion was to apply to households outside the buffer zone:

All affected households outside the buffer zone that are able to demonstrate ownership of land will be entitled to a grant by the state. Households that do not have ownership to the land are not entitled to this assistance.

Damages are assessed on a points basis, judged by a Verification Committee.²⁰ If a house is more than 40 per cent damaged, a grant of Rs. 250,000 ($ 2,500) is given in 4 instalments, based on progress. If a house is less than 40 per cent damaged, then a grant of Rs. 100,000 ($ 1,000) is provided, disbursed in 2 stages.²¹

Buffer Zones are a widely used operational approach to conservation in many different contexts. The concept of a buffer zone was a reaction to the widespread damage inflicted on communities who resided in close proximity to the coast. This approach not only highlighted the potential dangers of being very close to the sea but also drew attention to the considerable numbers of people who were, in effect, illegal squatters on government land or occupying houses that had been built in violation of law. In promulgating the buffer zone, an overriding concern of the government may have been that in the event of a similar natural catastrophe (another tsunami or cyclone) that led to loss of life or destroyed rebuilt houses, the government would inevitably be blamed in the absence of a designated no-build zone.

But there were also other considerations that probably played a part. The 1981 Coast Conservation Act (1981, as amended in 1988) prohibits any person to engage in a "development activity" (which includes aquaculture) within the coastal zone unless such person is authorized by a permit issued by the Director of Coast Conservation. According to the Act, no permit can be issued if the activity has any adverse effect on the stability, productivity and environmental quality of the coastal zone. This Act, however, has never been strictly enforced. It appeared, however, as if this was the time, at last, to start to implement some measures of coastal conservation that also ensured that significant numbers of people would be moved away from areas where they were vulnerable to wave damage. The Coastal Conservation Department (CCD) Chief, Dr. R. A. D. B. Samaranayake, for example, was reported to have pledged that that the CCD would from now on strictly adhere to the buffer zone rule and no new construction or reconstruction would be allowed, pointing out that many houses along the coastal line, which were destroyed by the tsunami, were illegal.²²

From the very outset the buffer zone became a politically controversial issue which generated significant opposition from community and business groups. The zone limits were not based on prior community consultations and did not correspond to tsunami damage. They did not take into account topographical and other relevant features of the land that would affect hazard risks. Hence the underlying rationale for the 100 and 200 meter limits appeared arbitrary. The government’s defence was that it needed to act fast before people moved back and a uniform approach was the fairest and quickest way to do so. There was also dissatisfaction that the rules applied only to residents whose houses were damaged but not to tourist enterprises who would be permitted to rebuild, and that households whose houses had not suffered damage were permitted to continue living in them. Indeed, much of the seaside of Galle Road in Colombo – one the most densely populated strips of land in the country – falls within the buffer zone. If the rationale for the buffer zone is public safety, then it should presumably be applied uniformly to all structures, though it may be argued that in a period of acute housing shortages, it would not be sensible to knock down undamaged houses or attempt to relocate large numbers of people who already have houses to live in.

Whatever merits the government’s case had – indeed the concept of a buffer zone for coastal eco-system management does have considerable value - the discriminatory manner in which the no-build rules applied were bound to create dissatisfaction and raise suspicions about possible ulterior motives. While many tsunami victims, particularly those whose houses had been severely damaged by the tsunami and had lost family members, were not enthusiastic about rebuilding in the same location,²³ they were concerned about being relocated away from their places of employment or business and about the possibility that they would lose their properties to others (such as tourist enterprises who could rebuild). Many tsunami victims were fishermen who need to keep their boats and supplies near the shore while some fishing activities – such as drawing in of large nets (Ma Del) – require community participation. In urban and densely populated areas, relocation of business-related buildings to an interior location could be very costly.

The community concerns were articulated in the political sphere. The main opposition party, the United National Party (UNP), declared that it was opposed to restrictions being placed on citizens who wanted to rebuild their tsunami damaged houses within the buffer zone. Nevertheless, senior government leaders continued to affirm their strong commitment to maintaining the buffer zone limits until quite recently. But, as pressure mounted, signs emerged that the government commitment may not be as firm as publicly stated. In some locations in the east coast, the policy had been relaxed by early August, though with no public pronouncements. By the end of August the government abandoned their inflexible approach to apply buffer zone restrictions, and a relaxation of policy appears to allow households within the buffer zone to repair or rebuild damaged houses, if they choose to do so. The full details of the new guidelines are, however, yet to be announced.

The implications of these changes on government policy on the buffer zone for the house reconstruction strategy and funding needs remain to be spelled out. If house rebuilding or repairs within the buffer zone do not attract financial assistance from the government (or from aid funds channelled through the government), the financial implications for the public house building programme would depend on decisions regarding the eligibility of those households to receive new alternative houses.

6.3 Housing Programme Progress

The housing situation for the tsunami-affected communities in Sri Lanka has made some progress. The number of displaced declined to 516,000 by mid-June 2005 from the 800,000 or so figure in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami as people returned to their homes (even if they are destroyed or damaged) and were removed from the statistics. An initial 169,000 people housed in schools and tents have largely been moved to transitional shelters (to bridge the gap between emergency accommodation and permanent housing). Transitional shelters were only being provided for the affected households in the buffer zone. By end August 2005, it was estimated by TAFREN that approximately 52,383 transitional shelters, housing some 250,000 tsunami displaced people, have been constructed since February 2005 on 492 sites. A total of 55,000 such shelters are expected to be completed by end September 2005, thus completing the transitional house building programme, and this target appears likely to be met. The need for care and maintenance of such shelters becomes increasingly important as permanent housing reconstruction becomes delayed. The GOSL has agreed with donor agencies and NGOs to a plan detailing the responsibilities for care and maintenance over the next 1-2 years.

Early estimates suggested the total number of houses fully or partially damaged to be around 113,000. Revised figures published by the Department of Census and Statistics at end August 2005 estimate the tsunami to have destroyed over 77,561 houses (the figures place the number of fully damaged housing units to be 41,393 and partially damaged housing units to be 36,168).²⁴ Of the total 77,500 houses damaged, nearly 50,000 are estimated to have been within the buffer zone stipulated by the GOSL requiring relocation of the households to new houses.

The government unit charged with this task is the Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Unit (THRU) based in the Urban Development Authority (UDA). The THRU has been signing Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with donors who have offered to construct houses (international and national NGOs and some private companies). The MOU states that “the donor shall bear the cost of construction of the housing units which has been estimated to be around Rs. 400,000 per single storey detached type housing unit including the cost of basic amenities such as water, electricity and sewage within the house”.²⁵ The MOU also states that the house must have a minimum of 500 square feet with two bedrooms, a living room, kitchen and toilet; and that construction must be in keeping with planning guidelines, design specification and standards given by the UDA. The donor must employ a contractor registered with the Institute for Construction Training and Development (ICTAD) or any other government construction agency. The type of pre-built housing will depend on the land available. The relatively slow progress in house construction has been attributed partly to problems associated with the acquisition of suitable land for relocation.

A survey carried out by the IPS indicates that if there is adequate land, the preferred option of most households is single storey detached houses on individual land plots of about 10 perches (IPS, 2005). As land becomes more limited, the proposals by order of preference include the following: (i) single storey attached houses with individual gardens; (ii) two-storey attached terraced houses with individual gardens (town-houses); and (iii) as a last resort, condominiums (limited to ground plus 2 or ground plus 3). Donors are to construct houses according to UDA guidance and site plans by the National Housing Development Authority (NHDA) and UDA. Many site plans, however, are allegedly prepared by architects visiting from Colombo with no consultation with users, which may create problems of insufficient space, and inappropriate design, and not suited to local conditions and requirements.

By end-August 2005 (according to data released by the THRU) a total number of 36,126 housing units had been assigned to donors through MOUs in 482 different sites (Table 4 [ PDF 254KB | 10 pages ]). There are wide variations in the numbers of total houses damaged and housing units allocated to donors for construction – for example, while Hambantota has already signed MOUs for almost as four times as many houses as had been damaged, Ampara had signed for less than half the requirements. Similarly the pace of house building is quite uneven. By end-August 2005, a total of 1271 houses had been completed while the construction of another 3,945 was in progress; of these 990 are to be found in Hambantota, while only 31 houses had been completed in Ampara.

Repairs and rebuilding in the area designated as ‘outside the buffer zone’ attract financial assistance. By end-August 2005, 13,757 had received the first instalment of Rs. 50,000 (US$ 500) for reconstructing fully damaged houses and 20,023 for renovating partly damaged houses (Table 5 [ PDF 254KB | 10 pages ]). The fact that a relatively large number of households has obtained the first instalment has been hailed by the World Bank as an indicator of its success:

“Money, whether it's from the Bank or other donors, is expected to flow quite smoothly to the 34,000 or so houses outside the buffer zone set-back from the sea.” ²⁶

However, it should be noted that very few have yet progressed beyond the first instalment. It is still too early to assess the likely progress of this programme. But as we discuss later the relatively large number of households that have received the first instalment may not be a good indicator of how this programme will perform over time.

Download this Discussion Paper [ PDF 423.3KB| 53 pages ].

Comment(s)

There are [2] comment(s) for this entry. Post a comment.

1. Dushi Weerakoon, one of the co-authors
   (posted 31 March 2006 / 11:43:50 AM)
   
   In response to the comment below:
   
   Besides funeral expenses, etc. a cash grant of $50 per month and $3.75 cash and food ration were given to all affected households (for approximately 4 months). For residents outside the buffer zone, if a house is more than 40% damaged, a grant of $2,500 is given in 4 instalments, based on progress. If a house is less than 40% damaged, then a grant of $1,000 is provided, disbursed in 2 stages. For residents within the buffer zone, the government planned to assist not only landowners, but all residents (including encroachers) with some form of housing. This was estimated to require around 50,000 permanent houses. Further quite considerable details on government handouts are contained in the report itself.
   
2. ken bacon
   (posted 18 December 2005 / 06:57:36 PM)
   
   This chapter notes that the government immediately paid money for funeral expenses, livelihood and cooking utensils. What additional government compensation has been provided? I am particularly interested in how the relatively generous post earthquake compensation program in Pakistan compares to government compensation for loss following the tsunami.