Introduction
The last two decades have witnessed a proliferation of formal regional trading
arrangements (RTAs) mostly in the form of free trade areas (FTAs). There is strong
demand to form or to join RTAs on political grounds. As Bhagwati (1997) puts it, “No
politician is happy unless he has put his signature on at least one of them.” There is also
an apparently strong compulsion to avoid being an outsider on economic grounds.1 As
far back as 1964, Robert Mundell demonstrated how trading partners who do not join a
preferential trading arrangement might be made worse off (through terms of trade
effects)2 even when global welfare is enhanced. Even in the absence of terms of trade
effects, the fact that an outsider’s competitors may have negotiated preferential access
to its major markets suggests that the costs of not joining could be high. The threat of
trade and investment diversion is viewed as a compelling reason to seek membership in
RTAs (Lawrence1996).
More recently, however, there has been significant interest in less formal
arrangements sometimes referred to as growth triangles or quadrangles or more
generally as subregionalism.3 Every member of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
today is also a member of at least one subregional or regional cooperation arrangement,
many are members of both, and some are even members of multiples of each. This is
sometimes referred to as the ”spaghetti bowl” effect (Bhagwati 1993).
In light of these developments, it is pertinent to ask the question, what are the interrelationships
between subregionalism, regionalism, and multilateralism? Apart from the
inter-relationships, it is also interesting to consider the conditions under which
subregionalism or regionalism can assist a country in moving towards multilateralism.
Put a different way; is there anything that countries can do to ensure that their
membership in subregional or regional cooperation arrangements will act as building
rather than stumbling blocks towards free and open trade and investment? The
relevance of this question is rooted in the fact that, in economic terms, preferential trade
liberalization will always be inferior to nondiscriminatory or multilateral tariff reductions.4
Thus, if subregionalism or regionalism can help move a country towards multilateralism,
then it is working in the right direction.
In answering these questions, we use the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS)
cooperation arrangement to represent subregionalism and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade Area (AFTA) to represent regionalism. These
choices are appropriate for our purpose because all countries in the GMS cooperation
arrangement are also members of AFTA and are either already members of the WTO or
are actively pursuing membership.
The paper is organized in 6 sections. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the
GMS program and AFTA to set the stage for the ensuing analysis. In Section 3, we
examine how subregionalism is affecting both regionalism and multilateralism. Next, we
turn to the relationship between regionalism and multilateralism. One of the questions
that we attempt to answer in this section is whether it is necessary to have ”open
regionalism” in order for the arrangement to be a building block towards multilateral
principles and objectives. In other words, can multilateral objectives be achieved even
without open regionalism? This question is relevant because some countries in the
region have pursued open regionalism while others have been somewhat reluctant to do
so. In Section 5, we look at what additional benefits WTO membership can bring to
countries that are already members of both subregional and regional cooperation
arrangements. A final section summarizes the main points.
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The views expressed in this paper are the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), its Board of Directors, or the governments they represent. ADBI does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this paper and accepts no responsibility for any consequences of their use. Terminology used may not necessarily be consistent with ADB official terms.
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