Foundations for Recovery

As noted earlier, the Indonesian Government responded to the disasters in three main phases: (1) emergency rescue and relief operations, (2) rehabilitation and reconstruction of basic socioeconomic infrastructure and restoration of law and order, and (3) reconstruction of the economy and government system. Due to the difficult economic and political conditions of Aceh and the sheer magnitude of the destruction of its infrastructure, the first phase of crisis management took much longer than expected.

With the second phase, there were three main concerns regarding the process of reconstruction. The first was the need to coordinate the activities conducted by the very large number of official and other agencies active in the field. The national government appointed Bappenas as the central agency for developing recovery planning for the tsunami-affected areas. The main challenge for Bappenas was to develop a master plan that satisfied all of the main institutions working in the province. For a considerable time, dialogue between Bappenas on the one hand, and local governments in the region on the other, was rather limited. Lacking direct involvement in much of the planning process, many local governments felt that they had been excluded from the reconstruction process by the central government. As a result, local governments had drawn up programs that in some cases were incompatible with Bappenas plans. At times, this led to duplication of activities and the inefficient utilisation of funds.

There were also cases of poor coordination of activities between NGOs and Bappenas. Many NGOs resisted accepting plans that emanated exclusively from Bappenas. Indeed, several groupings of NGOs developed their own reconstruction programs for Aceh and Nias although it was not clear how they intended to relate these plans to those of Bappenas or local governments.

In these difficult circumstances the Indonesian national government decided to establish a new agency to coordinate recovery activities. However local governments, communities, and private sector firms as well as NGOs were not very keen on this approach. They were worried that this new agency would add an additional bureaucratic layer to the problems of working in Aceh. They were also concerned that construction work would be tendered in Jakarta and would be won by large construction companies with good connections to high-ranking officers in the central government and that the implementation of these activities would be conducted without proper attention to the needs of local people. Local people and NGOs therefore pressed for a more decentralised approach (Athukorala and Resosudarmo, 2005).

A second concern related to security conditions in Aceh. The three decades of conflict between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian Government had held back development in the province and had severely limited the flow of news out of Aceh, both to other parts of Indonesia as well as to the rest of the world. For example, it was not until 28 December 2004—two days after the tsunami—that most of Indonesia and the rest of the world knew how badly the tsunami had hit Aceh. In contrast, news of the scale of the disaster in Sri Lanka and Thailand reached the international media almost immediately. Poor roads and telecommunications also made it difficult to provide speedy assistance to many villages along the coast of Aceh. Additionally, there were worries that the ongoing political conflict would hinder reconstruction operations.

A third concern was to ensure that commitments pledged by international donors would materialise in a timely manner. For various reasons beyond the control of Indonesian officials, there was a risk that some of the commitments would never translate into actual aid flows. It is also true, however, that limitations on Indonesia’s ability to absorb aid quickly were relevant. For these and other reasons, it soon became apparent that it was very important for Indonesian officials and local NGOs to work effectively with donors to minimise the mismatch between donors’ interests on the one hand and local reconstruction priorities on the other (Athukorala and Resosudarmo, 2005).

5.1. The Master Plan

The central government seemed to understand the need for more effective coordination with local governments and NGOs as well as for a more decentralised approach to the reconstruction effort. From March 2005 onwards, Bappenas conducted intensive consultations with community and political leaders in the affected areas as well as with NGOs and donors. Syiah Kuala University in Banda Aceh was given assistance to organise input from local communities into the consultation process while central and local government line agencies also provided expertise. Donors were also encouraged to contribute suggestions. The Master Plan that resulted was quite comprehensive though the central government recognised that no one plan could address every issue likely to arise in the rehabilitation process.⁸

Nevertheless, despite the extensive consultations, many local communities and NGOs reacted negatively to the Master Plan. Many local communities felt that their aspirations had not been properly reflected. In response, as a conciliatory gesture only a couple of days after his inauguration in April 2005, the new Head of the BRR, Dr. Kuntoro, agreed that many aspects had not been adequately covered in the Master Plan. He indicated that the BRR would not follow the plan to the letter and that rather, it would be used as a reference document in a flexible way (Kompas, 3 May 2005). The local Head of the BRR in Nias also agreed that the Master Plan was not necessarily a suitable strategy for redevelopment in Nias (Kompas, 19 August 2005). It was therefore soon agreed that an evolutionary approach would be adopted and that there would not be any single rigid “blueprint approach” that would guide the process of reconstruction (Indrawati, 2005; World Bank, 2005). For example, under the new approach communities were to be provided with opportunities to participate in decision-making about where, how, and by whom houses and other buildings were to be reconstructed. The central government would concentrate on the provision of principal infrastructure facilities such as main roads, electricity and water sanitation structures. Earlier plans that had outlined regulations for tough zoning, mandatory setbacks from the sea, relocation of local markets, and so on were set aside. Leaders in Jakarta committed themselves to ensuring that local people in Aceh and Nias were involved in the decision-making processes about such matters (Sen and Steer, 2005). In this way, disagreements between the central government on the one hand and local governments and communities on the other were kept to a minimum. If the reconstruction process in Aceh turns out to be successful over the long-term there is a strong likelihood that this pattern of strong collaboration between stakeholders will be adopted as the blueprint for regional development in other parts of Indonesia.

5.2. The Aceh-Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR)

The central government preferred to set up a special Aceh-Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Board as a one-stop shop for the coordination of all agencies and donors in Aceh and Nias. There was no strong objection from local governments, communities, NGOs, and international donors to this decision. There were two main reasons for this. First, the central government had shown that it was willing to collaborate with local stakeholders as well as donors in developing the Master Plan and to be flexible in implementing the plan. Second, the person appointed to head the BRR, as well as the deputies, had a reputation for being “clean” and capable.

In April 2005 the Government embarked on the second phase of recovery operations. On 16 April 2005, the Government established the Badan Rekonstruksi dan Rehabilitasi (BRR) Aceh-Nias, with the stated mission of restoring livelihoods and strengthening communities in Aceh and Nias by overseeing a coordinated, community-driven reconstruction and development program. Initially, the BRR was established as a coordinating rather than executive agency to operate for a four-year period. It is based in Banda Aceh, with a branch office in Nias and a representative office in Jakarta. Operationally, the BRR comprises three bodies: the Executive Agency (Badan Pelaksana or Bapel), the high-level Advisory Board (Badan Pengarah), and the Supervisory Board (Badan Pengawas). Since the end of 2005, the BRR has received an additional mandate to build around 120,000 houses in Aceh and Nias starting in 2006. With this mandate, the BRR to some extent took over responsibilities earlier given to the Ministry of Public Works (Tempo Interaktif, 26 December 2005).

The organisational structure of the BRR, since mid-2006, can be seen in Figure 3 [ PDF 102.5KB | 1 pages ]. The Executive Agency (Bapel), commonly referred to by the term BRR, is the body responsible for managing the reconstruction and rehabilitation activities. The BRR has four main offices and several regional offices. This structure is much leaner than in the initial period of its establishment.

The BRR has an Advisory Board chaired by the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs. This board consists of 17 representatives from central and regional governments, religious and adat (local custom) institutions, and other participants from civil society. It is responsible for ensuring that the aspirations of agencies and groups that they represent are reflected in the BRR's operational planning. The Supervisory Board, meanwhile, consists of nine members appointed by the President. It is made up of community representatives and technical advisers, including representatives of donor organisations. This board is responsible for ensuring that the reconstruction and rehabilitation activities are carried out effectively in a manner corresponding with the needs of local people (Kuncoro and Resosudarmo, 2006).

5.3. Peace Agreement

One of the few unexpected benefits of the bitter wind brought with the tsunami was a new willingness among political disputing parties in Aceh to cease military hostilities, and later to begin negotiations. The Government of Indonesia and the GAM understood that a peace treaty was an essential part of a successful reconstruction process in Aceh. A series of talks was conducted to bring about the process. Facilitated by the former President of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, GAM and Indonesian government officials commenced talks in February 2005 and signed an official peace agreement just six months later on 15 August 2005. The agreement provided for the cessation of all hostilities between the Government of Indonesia and the GAM. Key points of the agreement included the following (World Bank, 2006a):

• The Government of Indonesia and GAM would cease all hostilities; to this end, the Government of Indonesia would withdraw non-local military and police forces from Aceh by the end of 2005.

• GAM would decommission all arms, demobilise its 3,000 troops, and surrender 840 weapons.

• The Government of Indonesia would facilitate the establishment of Aceh- based political parties.

• Aceh would be governed under a new special law and would be entitled to 70 per cent of revenues from its natural resources.

• GAM members and political prisoners would be granted amnesty.

• A human rights court and a truth and reconciliation commission would be established.

• An Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) would be established by the EU and ASEAN.

Following the agreement, GAM surrendered all weapons and the Government of Indonesia withdrew all non-local military and police by the end of 2005. The EU and ASEAN oversaw the disarmament process by establishing the Aceh Monitoring Mission. A presidential decree was later issued granting amnesty to GAM members in exile in other countries and about 1,400 GAM members were released unconditionally from jails. The Government of Indonesia agreed to facilitate the formation of a local political party, which would participate in the election of local regional government representatives (World Bank, 2006a; World Bank, 2006b).

To reintegrate ex-GAM personnel into the community, the Indonesian Government agreed to provide assistance in both cash and kind. Each ex-combatant and released prisoner was to receive Rp5 million support (around US$500) in the form of cash and in kind from the Indonesian Government. It was estimated that around 3,000 ex-GAM combatants and 1,400 political prisoners would receive this support.

At the implementation stage, the planned package for former combatants was changed due to difficulties in providing rigorous proof of eligibility. Hence, the Government of Indonesia distributed three rounds of Rp1 million per person (around US$100) of livelihood assistance as a form of minimum social security.

In reality, as reported by the World Bank, the actual amount received by each former GAM member was much less, often being only around Rp170,000–260,000 (US$18– 30). This is because ex-GAM leaders included orphans and widows in their calculation of who should receive support, resulting in a greater number of people claiming assistance. The process of allocating the amount of money involved local people and was relatively transparent so that in general this approach was accepted without trouble (World Bank, 2006a).

The peace agreement, nevertheless, had several immediate side effects. It refueled efforts to form new provinces in Aceh by sub-dividing Aceh into several separate provinces. Since early 2000 various groups had aspired to form new provinces within Aceh. The two most favoured new provinces were Aceh Leuser Antara (consisting of Aceh Tengah, Aceh Tenggara, Aceh Singkil, Gayo Lues, and Bener Meriah districts) and Aceh Barat Selatan (consisting of Aceh Barat, Aceh Selatan, Simeulue, Aceh Barat Daya, Aceh Jaya, and Nagan Raya districts). The symbolic declaration of these two new provinces was made by several local government officers, local parliament members, and informal leaders in these eleven districts before thousands of supporters in Jakarta on 4 December 2005 (Kompas, 6 December 2005 and 14 August 2006).

The central government, however, is ambivalent about these plans to establish new provinces. Law 32 of 2004 on Regional Government allows for the formation of new administrative units, although, in practice, the exact mechanism involved is not clear. In various interviews officials from the Ministry of Home Affairs have said that consideration of the division of current Aceh into new provinces still has a long way to go. The current provincial government of Aceh has also maintained an ambivalent position delaying recommendations to the central government for the formation of the new provinces. Moreover, the ex-GAM activists who supported the Helsinki MoU were also opposed to the division of Aceh into several provinces because the Helsinki MoU states that the borders of Aceh correspond to those of 1 July 1956, and as such constitute the current province of Aceh. This reluctance may also be seen as a way for ex-GAM activists to maintain useful bargaining power.

On 11 December 2006, almost two years after the tsunami, for the first time in Indonesian history the Acehnese people voted to directly elect their own governor and district/municipality heads. The election process was widely judged as successful. There were no major conflicts, the division of Aceh did not become an issue, and the participation rate was very high. Interestingly, a prominent ex-GAM member, Irwandi Yusuf, won the election to be Governor of Aceh from 2007 to 2012. The success of this election and the fact that an ex-GAM member was able to win the election were promising signs that the peace agreement might eventually lead to a truly peaceful and democratic environment in Aceh.

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