Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, and Recovery

The BRR commenced operations in May 2005 and began to implement the agreed plans for rebuilding housing, infrastructure, and livelihoods. It followed the sequence of emergency and recovery activities shown in Figure 4 [ PDF 97.6KB | 1 pages ]. The plan was that the intensive relief operations that began in early 2005 would be wound down by mid- 2005 and formally ended in mid-2007. The main priority in the early period was to be house building. House building activities were expected to peak at the end of 2006 and be completed by the end of 2007. The second priority in the early period was rebuilding livelihoods. Rebuilding infrastructure would take longer—only limited activity was expected until 2006, but the activity was then expected to intensify rapidly and become the main priority from mid-2006 onwards. The process of rebuilding livelihoods and infrastructure was expected to be mostly complete by the end of 2009.

6.1. Land Titles

Significantly, the tsunami changed much of the physical landscape in some parts of Aceh. Not only were houses destroyed but worse, in many places boundaries and reference marks of land simply disappeared. Although less tragic than losing family members, the loss of land is one of the greatest blows that can befall an Acehnese family. For many people, land is their most valuable physical asset. In many cases, however, the legal documents of ownership were lost after the disaster. The changes the tsunami made to the contours of the landscape in some places also complicated claims of land ownership. There was also a risk of land-grabbing. In urban areas land-grabbing was more likely to affect the more vulnerable groups: women, children, and orphans. Because of all these concerns, tsunami survivors were sometimes seen installing markers on land where they believed their house had stood. In contrast, problems with land titles were much less serious in Nias. The earthquake in Nias caused houses to collapse but proprietary landmarks were unchanged. Where difficulties for individuals were concerned, land title problems in Nias were limited to the loss of legal documents.

Looking to the future, the protection of land rights is a high priority. Land rights provide the foundation for spatial planning, compensation, and long-term economic development. Indeed, already there have been some important cases where reconstruction activities have been delayed because people in the affected area were not satisfied with the arrangements under which ownership rights to land had been assigned for construction activities.

In response to this serious problem of land ownership, a US$28.5 million Multi-Donor Fund project for the Reconstruction of Aceh Land Administration System (RALAS) was launched in August 2005. RALAS has two major components: first, the reconstruction of property rights and the issuance of land titles, and second, the reconstruction of a land administration office in Aceh. The project, executed by the National Land Administration Agency (Badan Pertanahan National or BPN), is designed to identify land ownership and to issue land titles through establishing a community land inventory, recovering land records, and establishing a land database. It is estimated that when the project is finished in 2008, about 600,000 land titles will have been issued in Aceh and Nias (http://www.multidonorfund.org/).

Project implementation was expected to take place in several stages. First, community land mapping would be arranged, facilitated with the support of NGOs. After that, a team from BPN would arrange adjudication procedures that measured the land parcels and validated ownership and boundary demarcations. BPN would then issue public notifications of adjudication, and provided there were no objections, BPN would subsequently issue the land titles. Under the RALAS project all services were to be provided free of charge.

The first supervision team fielded in November 2005 observed that progress had been slow. The team noted that there had been delays on the part of the Indonesian Ministry of Finance in signing regulations for the waiver of taxes and other charges relating to the issuance of land titles. However the supervision team remained optimistic that the 2006 targets would still be met. The team also noted that the first component of RALAS was more advanced than the second. By end of 2006, about 17,400 land titles had been signed and 134,300 land parcels had been measured (BRR and Partners, 2006). This was certainly an achievement, demonstrating that local communities can effectively resolve such problems at grass root levels (UNORC, 2006).

6.2. Housing

Major housing rehabilitation, resettlement of displaced people, and restoration of basic utilities only began in mid-May 2005. According to SPAN 2005 data, around 66,700 displaced families (almost 300,000 IDPs) in Aceh and around 62,600 (around 340,000 IDPs) in Nias had returned to their areas by September 2005 (Table 8 [ PDF 65.3KB | 1 pages ]). However in Aceh only around 7,000 families (who were no longer considered internally displaced) and around 5,000 families in Nias had received new houses by this time. Most of the others (around 59,000 families in Aceh and 57,000 families in Nias) returned to their old properties even though their houses had not yet been renovated or rebuilt. For these people the first priority was to reclaim their properties and then wait until it was their turn for their houses to be rebuilt or renovated. Many families had to rent houses or stay with relatives.

During the second half of 2005 building activity gathered pace. The BRR estimated that by October 2005 around 10,000 houses had been built, by December around 16,000, by April 2006 around 42,000, and by December 2006 around 57,000 had been completed (Table 6). However, although activity accelerated in 2006, the number of houses completed was expected to be well behind the BRR target of 90,000–100,000 houses completed by the end of 2006.

The total estimated budget committed by donors and the Government of Indonesia for housing was almost US$976 million. Initially the BRR estimated that the cost of building a 36 square metre house was around US$3,000. Meanwhile, compensation to rehabilitate damaged houses varied, but for planning purposes the upper limit was also set at US$3,000. With this figure in mind, it was estimated that the total committed funding for housing would be enough to build or rehabilitate around 200,000 houses (BRR and International Partners, 2005).

However there were significant cost escalations. By the end of 2005 it was reported that the cost of building a new 36 square metre house had increased to around US$5,000 (BRR and International Partners, 2005). Table 9 [ PDF 67.8KB | 1 pages ] illustrates the significant increase in building costs compared to the situation before the disasters. Consequently, by early 2006, the BRR revised their estimate of the cost of a new 36 square metre house to around US$4,000 (BRR and International Partners, 2005).⁹

Why did construction costs rise after the tsunami? The issue of cost increases is an important one because recent reports from other places in the world hit by disasters (Pakistan, US/Katrina, and even in Yogyakarta/Indonesia after the Yogya earthquake) indicate that sharp cost increases in disaster zones are not unusual. But unusual or not, it is important to establish whether the cost increases reflected plausible economic factors or, instead, unacceptable profiteering. Looking at the components of construction costs in an effort to find answers, it is notable that increases in labour costs in Aceh and Nias were not as markedly high as the increase in prices in some other material inputs. It seems, therefore, that the supply of labour was apparently more elastic than the supply of materials. One likely reason for this is that the peace agreement in Aceh quickly led to an improvement in the security situation in the region. Hence, workers from elsewhere in Indonesia were apparently willing to move to Aceh for only small premiums over their existing wages. In addition, North Sumatra, adjacent to Aceh, is a relatively labour abundant region; it became the main source of outside labour for reconstruction in Aceh. Nias, on the other hand, never had a serious security problem. The main issue affecting the supply of labour there was the ease of transportation to the island after the reconstruction begun. It appears that the reconstruction efforts attracted outside labourers to take up work in Nias.

At first glance, a large increase in the price of timber is surprising given that Indonesia, and Sumatra in particular, is well endowed with forest resources. The BRR estimated that the housing reconstruction activities would need about 1.5 million cubic metres of timber. Many observers estimated that this amount could easily be supplied from normal domestic timber production supplemented by drawing on seized illegal timber stocks held by the Indonesian Government as well as small amounts of imported timber and supplies provided by donor countries. However, it is now thought that the significant increases in timber prices are probably related to difficulties in accessing the stocks of seized illegal timbers and in using imported and donated timbers. To explain further, from the outset there was a consensus among the BRR, donors, and NGOs that reconstruction activities in Aceh and Nias would only use legal timber, and where possible would only use timber available locally or from elsewhere in Indonesia (Jawa Post, 27 December 2006). This attitude introduced legal and administrative bottlenecks that restricted the supply of timber in the short-run. Moreover, the legal status of the stocks of seized illegal timbers needed to be clarified before the timber could be released use for in Aceh. Similarly, criteria establishing the amount of timber that could be imported and the guidelines for the use of timber provided by donor countries needed to be established. Reflecting general concerns about these issues, there has been a call for serious efforts from the Government to legalise the use of illegal timbers so that they could be utilised immediately. The matter was not as straight-forward as it might seem since there were valid concerns that the legalisation of illegal timber might encourage further illegal logging because of the possibility of legalising this product.

It may seem surprising that the supply of other building material inputs has not been more elastic. Construction activities in other parts of the country since the crisis have been relatively sluggish compared to the situation before the 1997 crisis and it is likely that there was excess capacity in other regions. But even if inputs for house reconstruction can be accessed relatively easily elsewhere in Indonesia, it takes time to physically move materials and for labourers to arrive. There are therefore practical constraints on the rate at which housing can be supplied. Realistically, the upper limit of housing construction achievable may be significantly lower than the original BRR target of 90,000–100,000 houses by the end of 2006.

6.3. Livelihoods

Efforts to rehabilitate livelihoods involved several activities. First, steps were taken to restore the agriculture and fishery sectors through revitalising agricultural and plantation land, rebuilding ports, and replacing lost fishing boats. Second, microfinance, other forms of cheap credit, and assistance were made available for small and medium enterprises. Third, employment programs such as cash-for-work and training programs were developed (BRR and International Partners, 2005).

By December 2006 the BRR reported that approximately 50,000 hectares of agricultural land had been restored (around 70 per cent of the total area damaged). In the fishery sector about 4,400 boats had been replaced and around 6,800 hectares of fish ponds had been repaired (approximately 30 per cent of the total area of fish ponds damaged) (Table 6).

The information available on how many activities need to be rehabilitated and created, however, is not very clear. Table 4 indicates that more than 260,000 people in Aceh and 85,000 in Nias lost their sources of income. But it is also important to note that unemployment and poverty were serious problems in Aceh and Nias before the disasters.

SPAN 2005 data indicates that in September 2005 around 46 per cent of the population in Aceh above the age of ten (around 63 per cent of the population in Nias) were engaged in some form of employment while around 10 per cent in Aceh (6 per cent in Nias) were unemployed (Table 10 [ PDF 86.2KB | 1 pages ]). Of those who worked, around 49 per cent in Aceh (56 per cent in Nias) were self-employed (Table 11 [ PDF 94.3KB | 1 pages ]), which is common in the informal sectors. Approximately 14 per cent in Aceh (24 per cent in Nias) of those who were working were unpaid workers, most likely family members involved in family businesses. Around 15 per cent in Aceh (7 per cent in Nias) of IDPs and ex-IDPs were unable to find any employment, suggesting that reconstruction activities in the early post-disaster period were not able to generate employment for significant numbers.

Overall, around 300,000 jobs in Aceh and around 30,000 in Nias need to be created, certainly a challenging task. By April 2006, the BRR reported that around 148,000 people had received some skill training to enable them to re-enter the job market and that more than 41,000 farmers had been assisted to return to their fields (BRR, 2006). By December 2006, the BRR claimed that around 69 per cent of the male and 36 per cent of the female labour force in urban areas as well as around 68 per cent of the male and 45 per cent of the female labour force in rural areas of both Aceh and Nias were actively engaged in some form of work (BRR and Partners, 2006). Nevertheless, reliable data on how many of the people who were unemployed in mid- 2005 actually obtained some form of employment is not available.

6.4. School and Health Services

Table 6 indicates that in the aftermath of the disasters around 2,000 school buildings needed to be rebuilt and approximately 2,500 teaching positions needed to be refilled. It should be noted that there was a serious shortage of teachers in Aceh even before the tsunami. By December 2006, the BRR reported that around 750 school buildings had been built and approximately 5,400 teaching positions had been filled. In other words, in terms of school buildings, only around 40 per cent of the target had been reached but the number of teachers now exceeded pre-tsunami levels, thus partially alleviating the teacher shortage (BRR and Partners, 2006).

In rebuilding the education system in Aceh and Nias, besides taking into account the damage caused by the disasters it is important to understand local needs. Table 12 [ PDF 110.1KB | 1 pages ] shows the numbers of children and young adults who have never been to school and those who have dropped out. Around 23,000 young persons aged 7 to 24 years old in Aceh and around 31,000 in Nias have never been to school. Table 13 [ PDF 87.1KB | 1 pages ], furthermore, shows that among those who have dropped out of school, around 50,000 in Aceh and 30,000 in Nias did not obtain any elementary education degree. Thus, considering the low elementary school attainments and the low attainments at higher educational levels, even if the elementary schools and teacher numbers are restored to pre-disaster levels they will still fall well below those needed to rebuild a better Aceh and Nias.

In the health sector, by December 2006 324 hospitals and health centres had been rebuilt. This far exceeds the number of hospitals and health services damaged by the earthquakes and tsunami. It should be said that health facilities before the disasters were in a state of neglect and the need for health facilities has substantially increased in the aftermath. Approximately 63,000 people in Aceh and Nias suffered some mental problems following the disasters and although reconstruction activities are underway, the risk of communicable disease outbreaks remains high. Looking at household sources of drinking water and sanitation facilities (Table 14 [ PDF 70.9KB | 1 pages ] and Table 15 [ PDF 72.6KB | 1 pages ]), it can be seen that access to piped water in Aceh and Nias has been very limited and relatively few households have septic tanks.¹⁰ Moreover, many people are still living in shelters. With the majority of people in Aceh depending mainly on wells for drinking water, it is important to monitor the water quality of these wells.

6.5. Infrastructure

Towards the end of 2005 USAID signed an MOU with the Ministry of Public Works to reconstruct 240 kilometres of road from Banda Aceh to Meulaboh. Phase 1 of the project (80 km—connecting Banda Aceh to Lamno) was expected to be completed by August 2006. Phase 2 of the project, the remaining 160 kilometres, was expected to take another two or more years. Meanwhile, the Japan International Cooperation Agency agreed to rehabilitate the existing 122-kilometre road from Calang to Meulaboh (BRR and Partners, 2006).

Moreover, the Asian Development Bank has agreed to finance the rehabilitation of another main route, a 490-kilometre road connecting Banda Aceh with North Sumatra. Overall the total road length needing to be rehabilitated or built in Aceh following the disaster was around 3,000 kilometres (Table 6). Nias, naturally, does not need as many roads as Aceh (BRR and International Partners, 2005).

Besides roads, the BRR also indicated that 14 seaports, 11 airports and air strips, 120 arterial bridges, and around 1,500 minor bridges need to be rebuilt (Table 6). Compared with progress in other sectors, infrastructure reconstruction has been relatively slow. The BRR reported that around 1,200 kilometres of roads in Aceh and 300 kilometres in Nias had been built or repaired as at December 2006. Further, 14 ferry terminals and harbours, 8 airports and airstrips, and 158 bridges had been restored (BRR and Partners, 2006). The types of problems causing slow progress in this area can be illustrated by an example. The construction of the road from Banda Aceh to Meulaboh is experiencing serious delays. Issues concerning land acquisition and poor weather have been mentioned as the main reasons for the delay (USAID, 2006). As far as land acquisition is concerned, significant differences have emerged between the kind of road that local people want and what USAID wants to build. USAID plans to build a highway with seven-metre carriageways and two-metre shoulders. Locals, however, not only fear speeding traffic but would also like to be able to sell snacks and tea from stalls along the roadside (The New York Times, 9 October 2006). The dilemma is an interesting one. While, as noted earlier, the Indonesian Government has been willing to set aside the Master Plan and follow a more bottom-up approach by taking into account local voices, some donors seem to be committed to a top-down approach.

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