Abstract
After successful emergency relief operations, Sri Lanka initiated post-tsunami
reconstruction with optimism and a relatively rapid recovery was expected. However,
initial expectations have turned out to be overly optimistic. Coordination problems
between agencies, constraints on aid absorption capacity, and inequities in aid
distribution among regions have hampered reconstruction. Infrastructure reconstruction
targets have not been fully met. Initial expectations that the tsunami experience would
lead to peace were not fulfilled, inequitable distribution exacerbated mistrust, and largescale
conflict has resumed. Macroeconomic management and efficient absorption of a
large, necessarily temporary, inflow of foreign funds has been a daunting task.
Construction costs rapidly escalated, producing unanticipated funding gaps and
aggravating fiscal deficit problems. Sri Lanka’s experience highlights the need for
anticipating such cost increases when assessing needs following major disasters, as
well as the need for formulation of a phased programme of reconstruction which takes
into account the supply side constraints of construction inputs.
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