Background
The earthquake that caused the tsunami on 26 December 2004 occurred at 6:58 am Sri
Lanka time with the first large wave hitting the east coast at 8:35 am. Within a very short
time over 36,000 people were dead (this total includes the 5,644 who remain classified
as ‘missing’), and several hundred thousand had been displaced. Massive damage had
also been inflicted on thousands of houses and other buildings, railways, bridges,
communication networks, and other infrastructure and capital assets.
Although Sri Lanka had experienced periodic droughts, floods, landslides, and the
occasional cyclone, in recorded history it had never experienced a tsunami, or indeed
any other type of natural disaster of this scale and magnitude.1 Although the country was
completely unprepared for a disaster of this scale, the relief effort that got underway
almost immediately—initially organized by local communities, followed by the
government and international agencies—was able to feed, clothe, and shelter survivors;
provide the injured with medical attention; and ensure that the thousands of bodies were
cremated or buried, avoiding any disease outbreaks. The initial response is generally
agreed to have been a success despite the understandable confusion which
accompanied this effort at times.
However, as described in our earlier report on this issue (Jayasuriya, Steele and
Weerakoon, 2006), it became clear as the reconstruction and rehabilitation phase
proceeded that moving from the immediate relief effort to addressing the massive
reconstruction tasks posed a different set of challenges that was in many ways more
complex. The tsunami had come at a time of deterioration of the macroeconomic
environment: GDP growth was slowing from the second quarter, inflationary pressure
had been persistently building from the middle of 2004, fiscal and external current
account deficits were growing, and the currency was rapidly depreciating.
As explained in the earlier report, the tsunami—paradoxically—brought a measure of
stability to the economy, which had been straining under growing macroeconomic
imbalances. For Sri Lanka, as for other affected countries that were ready to accept
external assistance, the promised international assistance appeared to be more than
adequate to cover the full costs of immediate relief and reconstruction, and produced an
almost euphoric (though impermanent) national mood. In particular, it provided an
unanticipated source of foreign capital inflows for the relief and reconstruction effort and
enabled the country to avoid the slide towards a currency crisis. Not only did the
additional influx of foreign capital allow Sri Lanka to maintain a fairly healthy balance of
payments (BOP) during 2005–2006, but relief and reconstruction-related expenditures
also boosted GDP growth to a healthy annual average of 6.7 per cent over the same
period.
While the tsunami diverted attention away from the growing structural imbalances in the
economy, they were not eliminated. As the reconstruction and rehabilitation phase
proceeds—albeit at a slower pace than initially anticipated—issues taking centre stage
relate to the effectiveness with which resources were mobilized, the effectiveness of
delivering assistance and its coordination, and the gaps opening up in financing
reconstruction and the implications of these financing gaps for macroeconomic policy
management. The aim of this study is to contribute to the discussions and debates on
appropriate policies for the medium-term reconstruction effort by providing an analysis of
some of the priority issues emerging from Sri Lanka’s experience of post-tsunami
reconstruction and rehabilitation. We update and expand the discussion and analysis of
the earlier report and draw on a survey of affected households in an attempt to obtain a
broader understanding of the perceptions of the recovery process at the grass-roots
level.2
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The views expressed in this paper are the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), its Board of Directors, or the governments they represent. ADBI does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this paper and accepts no responsibility for any consequences of their use. Terminology used may not necessarily be consistent with ADB official terms.
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