Endnotes

¹Sri Lanka had no effective domestic hazard warning system, and had not felt the need to be part of international early warning systems, such as the Tsunami Warning System (TWS) in the Pacific (which has 26 member countries).

²Two household surveys of the tsunami-affected families were carried out by the Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka (IPS). The first survey was carried out in April 2005 (IPS-TS 2005) covering 622 households in six affected districts. The second survey of the same households was carried out in July 2006 (IPS-TS 2006). See Appendix 1 for details on methodology and coverage of the survey.

³The significant differences between total recovery needs and damages in some sectors are due to the fact that the recovery strategy for those sectors focuses on long-term development targets rather than merely on restoration.

⁴The GOSL identified its needs for a 3–5 year rehabilitation phase.

⁵For example, while food rations were generally available, there were problems with the provision of adequate variety and quality in some locations; complaints emerged about the application of different rules in different areas for the distribution of rations and cash grants.

⁶An assessment of the initial response to the tsunami at the Sri Lanka Development Forum 2005 can be found at www.erd.gov.lk/DevForum/

⁷As of end 2006, 42,096 of the 57,057 shelters originally constructed had been decommissioned with only 14,961 shelters remaining occupied (GOSL, 2006).

⁸About 53 per cent of the surveyed houses made unusable by the tsunami were less than 450 square feet, while only 10 per cent were bigger than 600 square feet.

⁹About 32 per cent of roofs of the surveyed houses were made of cadjan or metal sheets, while close to half of the surveyed houses had walls made of temporary material.

¹⁰About 13 per cent of surveyed households inside the buffer zone owned houses on government land, while a further 9 per cent owned houses built on other people’s private land.

¹¹The new boundaries were set according to the Coast Conservation Department (CCD) Coastal Management Plan of 1997.

¹²Zone 1 referred to any state reservation within tsunami-affected areas while Zone 2 is any area outside Zone 1.

¹³Extended since to co-financing arrangements through local and foreign NGOs as well.

¹⁴Sunday Times, 14 May 2006. About 3 per cent of the households surveyed in the IPS-TS 2006 had shifted from one NGO-allocated list to another. The most common reasons for switching were: expectation of better assistance, to move closer to the sea, or because the first NGO had failed to deliver a house.

¹⁵Daily Mirror, 28 January 2006.

¹⁶Sunday Observer, 27 August 2006.

¹⁷RADA estimates place those who have lost livelihoods at 200,000 with a further 125,000 jobs being lost indirectly (see www.rada.gov.lk).

¹⁸About a half of the household heads that have changed their livelihoods come from one GND, in the Eastern Province.

¹⁹Further, the current housing situation does not appear to have any effect on livelihood recovery.

²⁰Key informants in almost all surveyed districts in the Southern Province, and in around half of the surveyed districts in the Eastern Province, thought people are better-off now because of aid, training, and more employment opportunities. There were also considerable differences between clusters of villages.

²¹There is some debate about the exact numbers of boats damaged and repaired. For most boat types, the number of crafts repaired has exceeded the numbers reported as damaged. It has been suggested that boat owners in non-tsunami-affected areas may have transferred their boats to these areas to take advantage of the opportunity to get minor repairs done, that there may have been mis-categorisation of beach seine crafts as traditional crafts, and that boats classified as destroyed may have been repaired and put back to sea.

²²Cited in MFAR (2006).

²³RADA (2006).

²⁴The efficiency implications of the misallocation of these fishery assets may be corrected over time as those who were mistakenly given boats etc. may subsequently sell them to genuine fisher folks who can make use of them. But this would not be much consolation for people who had lost assets and lack the necessary finances to buy them, even at discount prices.

²⁵This had some other cash grant components too, including a grant for a family death. According to the IPS-TS 2005 data (collected in April/May 2005), all surveyed districts had received funds of SLRs.15,000 for deaths, SLRs.2500 for kitchen equipment, and a SLRs.5000 livelihood grant and food/cash coupon.

²⁶The US$3.4 billion includes debt relief/moratorium and IMF support.

²⁷After one month, with the conclusion of immediate relief operations TAFRER and TAFLOL were amalgamated to a single entity—the Task Force for Relief (TAFOR)—to implement all relief measures, and the operations of the CNO were scaled down. In February, the CNO was dissolved and officials returned to line ministries. TAFOR and TAFREN took over the responsibilities of the CNO. With the completion of transitional housing, TAFOR was expected to wind down operations and its responsibilities passed to the line ministries.

²⁸This report on the tsunami rehabilitation covers the period 26 December 2004 to 30 June 2005. See GOSL (2005b).

²⁹Specifically, these elements were the Regional Fund and the location of the regional committee in the rebel-held Kilinochchi city.

³⁰There were varying estimates of the extra demand for house construction, but they all pointed to a massive increase in demand for scarce construction labour and materials. According to the Chamber of Construction Industry, as reported in the Daily Mirror, 21 February 2005, it was estimated that at least 100,000 additional workers would be required, including about 13,000 masons, 2,000 carpenters, 2,500 painters, and nearly 54,000 unskilled labourers.

³¹Organizations involved in tsunami housing construction are required to use ICTA registered contractors.

³²For example, adding workers to the government pay-roll saw payments on salaries and wages rising from 5.2 per cent of GDP in 2004 to 5.9 per cent of GDP in 2005; transfers and subsidies over time increased from 4 per cent of GDP in 2003 to 5.4 per cent of GDP in 2005.

³³The currency depreciated to SLRs.105.47 per US dollar on 17 December 2004—the highest rate in the interbank market. It had appreciated to SLRs.98.11 by 12 January 2005. The appreciation of the rupee for the rest of the year was also partly influenced by the movement of major currencies as the US dollar appreciated against them.

³⁴The government was forced to lay down specific standards for new houses because of large differences in size, quality, etc. among donor-built houses.

Download this Discussion Paper [ PDF 312.3KB| 40 pages ].

Comment(s)

There are [0] comment(s) for this entry. Post a comment.