Introduction
The literature on the Asian financial crisis typically contends that financial liberalization and
the removal of obstacles to foreign borrowing by banks and the corporate sector, coupled
with poor and inadequate prudential supervision, gave rise to the risk of moral hazard and
the resulting financial crisis. Consequently and not surprisingly, the enhancement of
prudential regulation and supervision1 of banks through the adoption of international
standards or "best practices" was among the recommendations and prerequisites for the
recovery of the affected Asian economies. The architecture of financial supervision and any
need for change also became an important issue to be addressed. Thus, strengthening the
supervisory mechanism under the International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs for
Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand also required the establishment of integrated
prudential regulators (Gochoco-Bautista et al., 1999). However, to date, only the Republic of
Korea has managed to completely undertake such a reform. In fact, the desirability of unified
regulatory agencies—that is, agencies that supervise two or more of the traditional financial
services sectors—has in itself become the focus of significant research recently. The primary
reason has been the trend towards the forming of financial conglomerates.
This paper examines the issue of reforming financial regulatory structures from the New
Institutional Economics perspective. That is, it investigates how the broader institutional
environment prevailing in a developing country like the Philippines may affect the institutional
arrangements for financial regulation, and how these might be taken into consideration when
designing or reforming financial regulatory structures.
The paper has six sections. Section II describes the state of financial conglomerates in the
Philippines and how they are currently supervised to determine whether any significant
reform in the financial regulatory structure is warranted. Section II also discusses how the
Philippine experience compares to those in other countries in the region. Section III
discusses the supervisory implications of financial conglomeration, and the various
regulatory approaches that have been adopted to address them. In Section IV, the role of
institutions in economic development is discussed, particularly as seen through the New
Institutional Economics (NIE) paradigm. The overall institutional environment of the
Philippines is also discussed. Drawing on the NIE perspective, alternative approaches taking
an institutional perspective to view financial sector issues and policies are then presented in
Section V. In particular, the issue of reforming financial regulatory structures is analyzed
from the new political economy perspective. Finally, Section VI presents some
recommended modifications to the financial regulatory framework in the Philippines.
This paper does not cover the theoretical arguments for and against financial conglomerates
or the historical rationale, evolution, and supervision of financial conglomerates in the
Philippines. Neither does it analyze the various regulatory approaches, including the trend
towards having a single financial regulator model. These approaches have been discussed
in an earlier paper.2 Current regulatory problems in individual financial sectors that are not
directly related to financial conglomerates are mentioned to highlight the key issue with
respect to the Philippine financial regulatory framework.
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The views expressed in this paper are the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), its Board of Directors, or the governments they represent. ADBI does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this paper and accepts no responsibility for any consequences of their use. Terminology used may not necessarily be consistent with ADB official terms.
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