Introduction
There has recently been much discussion on the state of the regional economies
coinciding with the tenth anniversary of the Asian financial crisis. As has been widely
noted, the Asian economies recovered quickly from the crisis and are now amongst the
fastest growing in the world. Since Asia has not experienced further crises in the past
decade, can one infer that the region is now less vulnerable to the destabilizing effects of
unfettered international capital flows? After all, considerable efforts have been
undertaken to build buffers and reduce vulnerabilities. Compared to the pre-crisis period,
the Asian economies are now run more conservatively, have strengthened current
accounts, and have significant buildups in foreign reserves. Meanwhile, the financial
systems in the region have become more resilient, with the restructuring of balance
sheets and the enhancement of surveillance.
However, there has been a resurgence of private capital flows into Asia in recent years.
This resurgence has largely been attributed to the search for high-yielding investments
arising from low interest rates in developed countries.1 In view of the pro-cyclicality of
such capital flows (Kaminsky et al., 2004), some question whether the region's exposure
to a capital flow reversal will lead to yet another financial crisis. It is clear that structural
reforms and stronger economic fundamentals have increased Asia's robustness towards
such financial shocks. In contrast to the 1997 Asian crisis, the region has greater
capacity to accommodate the capital outflows so that a liquidity crunch or balance of
payments crisis is improbable. Nonetheless, should there be a sudden large-scale
reversal of capital flows and investor confidence is undermined, financial market distress
and other risk scenarios may ensue (Khor and Kit, 2007). In particular, the attendant
sharp corrections in asset prices will have an adverse impact on the economy especially
through indirect channels.
The purpose of this study is to present Singapore's experience in managing the risks
posed by capital flows as well as the retention of control over exchange rates and
monetary conditions. At the outset, we note that Singapore has the support of strong
economic fundamentals including persistent budget surpluses, huge foreign exchange
reserves, substantial current account surpluses, high savings rates, low inflation, robust
institutions, a sound financial system, and a stable currency. In this paper, we address
three key issues: Singapore's exchange rate-centered monetary policy framework,
monetary policy operations since the crisis, and the non-internationalization of the
Singapore dollar. We consider how these three broad areas, along with a framework of
consistent macroeconomic and microeconomic policies, contribute towards defending
Singapore against instability arising from free capital mobility.
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The views expressed in this paper are the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), its Board of Directors, or the governments they represent. ADBI does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this paper and accepts no responsibility for any consequences of their use. Terminology used may not necessarily be consistent with ADB official terms.
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