Conclusion: Lessons Learned
This section summarizes lessons drawn from the authors' reviews as they relate to this
paper. The conclusions are subject to the different results of various case studies, which are
influenced by specific environments. However, general directions one may consider when
implementing CF in particular settings can reasonably be stated as follows:
- At the initial stage of contract farming, it is necessary that both contractors and
growers have a clear understanding of the concept and roles they play in an
agreement. Rigid contracts are untenable, as farmers do not fully understand
concepts, standards of quality, or loss due to late or untimely delivery.
- The rigidity of contract terms, which is for fairness to both parties, does not apply to
all types of commodities; it depends on local settings. Policies should be directed
towards encouraging competition among firms for growers.
- Farmers need time to adapt to technology and new habits. Contract crops usually
require precise working schedules and intensive management. Farmers may not
obtain desirable returns in the first year. Yield and quality risk may discourage
farmers' continuation of contracts. Contract agreements designed to spread risks
among parties have been appreciated, as in the case of frozen vegetable crops.
Minimum returns with intensive and close supervision by firms to avoid crop failure
can be incentives.
- The public sector has a role to play in technological and institutional development.
Government should plan incentives they can manage. Universities, with the support
of firms and local officials, can provide regular training in the early stages.
- Although agribusiness took the lead in contract farming, government policies have
provided a favorable environment for domestic and foreign investment through
taxation, financing, and the 4-sector plan. For example, the success of tomato
contracts in less developed areas (Northeast) was due to irrigation and infrastructure
improvement, understanding by farmers, efficient coordination, transparency and
timely supervision.
- For annual crops, contract farming in more developed areas (North) appears to be
effective for linking smallholders to the market. Farmer selection is unrelated to land
size. Tenant farmers have an equal chance to join the project.
- With rising land prices and a competitive global market, firms need to minimize costs
for given quality. Competition has led to competitive prices for potatoes, soybean and
eggplant. There is a need for government biotechnology research into quality,
efficiency improvement, and cost reduction. Domestic firms should also conduct
adaptive research for specific localities.
- Farmers need information on risk management so they can allocate risk between
contract and non-contract cultivation. Innovation (e.g., cold storage for seed) allows
farmers to cultivate outside the contract even for the same firms and gain high prices
for early harvest. In this case, contracts are no longer the best choice for potato
growers at some sites.
- Commitment from local officials is a key element of success in the early stages of
contract farming. There should be a non-financial incentive system to encourage
officials' involvement.
- Contract farming can be promising for agro-industry development. The quality of farm
produce can be rapidly improved through contract farming to meet global market
standards. This will require thorough effort from local agencies. It is also important to
control exploitation of farmers by private firms.
- Price stabilization can help alleviate income risk; however, firms' quasi-monopolistic
power could dampen productivity. This role could be better if firms apply more
competitive pricing.
- Thailand's experience reveals that contract farming has been a successful means for
the poor farmer majority to participate in the market. There is the potential for
increasing farmers' economic capacity by contracting in an open market.
- Contract farming is a commercial activity, and none of the reviewed literature
indicates growers' welfare or health issues. Therefore arrangements need to
consider liability and health aspects for participating farmers.
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The views expressed in this paper are the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), its Board of Directors, or the governments they represent. ADBI does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this paper and accepts no responsibility for any consequences of their use. Terminology used may not necessarily be consistent with ADB official terms.
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