Organic Agriculture and Biofuels in Cambodia and the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR)
This policy brief has the following findings for both countries:
- Assistance should be provided to build certification capacity in
both OA and biofuels.
- In addition to a third-party certification system, alternative
certification systems based on existing social capital should be
developed and utilized, particularly for the domestic market.
- Even as more farmers go organic, concerns about undersupply
of organic fertilizer appear to be unwarranted.
- Assessment of biofuels' local environmental impacts also
requires careful analysis.
- Intergovernmental organizations should support these
countries in identifying carbon credits of biofuels and OA and
in promoting the technologies and processes that generate
measurable and worthwhile benefits.
In the case of Cambodia, the following results are noted:
- OA through the System of Rice Intensification (SRI) should be
promoted. Converting cultivated land by 20% of wet season
rice farmers to SRI increases the farmers' incomes by 40% to
70%. About 21,300 households could escape poverty. Export
sales could reach US$180 million.
- Two biofuel crops may be attractive options: jatropha and
cassava.
- Under the jatropha program, 10,000 hectares are to be
cultivated in 2008, increasing to 40,000 hectares by 2010.
Fifty-six percent of the land is to be given to smallholders
and the remaining 44% to commercial growers and
biodiesel processors.
The smallholder program would benefit farmers
more than the concessionaire program. The former
could take between 6,500 and 7,900 households out of
poverty, vis-à-vis 1,400 to 1,500 for the latter. The
smallholder program would produce 27% less biodiesel and
would be financially unviable if the amount produced fell in
the lower end of the yield range unless some subsidy was
provided. Issues to be addressed are: (i) identification and
processing of the carbon credits, (ii) reduction of the risks of
failure (in case the price of oil falls) through a price
guarantee program, and (iii) a capacity building support
program.
- In the case of cassava, private sector interest is already
present. A program should be developed to increase yields
from the current 17.8 tons/hectare to a possible 22.8
tons/hectare by 2012.
- Similarly, the program would have a smallholder part and
a concessionaire part. The former would target 20,000
households initially, going up to 30,000 by 2011. It would
take about 7,000 households out of poverty and could
increase farmers' net incomes to US$14.5 million by 2011.
Again, the concessionaire component would have higher
yields, creating about 2,000 jobs, but has fewer social
benefits. Cassava roots could be used partly for ethanol
production for export, which could earn US$65 million by
2011. However, the project needs to be evaluated in terms
of the cost of the support program and analyzed with
respect to the possible carbon credits.
- Given limited funds, OA rice using the SRI method should be
given the highest priority as it generates the greatest
increases for the smallest inputs, followed by the jatropha
project and finally the cassava project.
In the case of the Lao PDR, the following results are noted:
As data for the Lao PDR are less comprehensive, the analysis that
follows is less rigorous and the recommendations more generic.
- The study focusing only on rice crops in the Lao PDR yielded
the following findings:
- With experts' advice, Good Agriculture Practice and OA
can be combined in a program following the regional
demarcations laid out by the government.
- If yields could be maintained and if marketing and
communication could be improved, farmers' income could
increase by 15%.
- With a program covering around 100,000 households, of
which half are upland and the other half lowland, an
increase in incomes of about US$5.6 million is feasible,
taking about 33,000 households out of poverty. The
program would cost about US$52 million.
- Regarding biofuels, similarly to the case of Cambodia, cassava
and jatropha crops are attractive options but further
investigation and development are needed before they can be
implemented, as current targets are unrealistic.
- The program's economic benefits should be similar to those
in Cambodia (i.e., a smallholder program benefits more
poor farmers than a concession program).
- The program's viability will depend on the price of
biodiesel. At USą40/liter, only the concession program
would be viable. As in the case of Cambodia, some subsidy
or support for smallholders may be needed.
- For the cassava program, yields should be increased from
6.8 tons/hectare (one of the lowest levels in Asia) to around
17.8 tons/hectare to be on par with Cambodia. To avoid
conflicts and even hardships within local communities, the
government needs to improve the framework for
concessions of land to private investors.
- As with Cambodia, the Good Agriculture Practice rice
development program should be prioritized, with certified OA
programs being developed where market niches can be
identified.
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The views expressed in this paper are the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), its Board of Directors, or the governments they represent. ADBI does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this paper and accepts no responsibility for any consequences of their use. Terminology used may not necessarily be consistent with ADB official terms.
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