Exchange Rate and ReserveManagement Policy Issue
Asian economies entered the onset of the crisis with considerable
diversity in exchange rate arrangements. Some currencies (such
as the Korean won and the Indonesian rupiah) were floating
with considerable flexibility, while others remained tightly
managed. With the crisis, those two flexible currencies
depreciated sharply, while the PRC and Singapore terminated
the policy of allowing their currencies to appreciate gradually
against the US dollar (Figure 4 [ PDF 268.3KB | 1 page ]). Viet Nam, in late 2008,
devalued the dong and widened the trading band against the US
dollar. As most other currencies also softened against the US
dollar, these developments meant that the Japanese yen, which
remained flexible, became the only currency that appreciated
against the US dollar, in part reflecting the unwinding of the
yen carry-trade and greatly reduced interest rate differentials
favoring other major currencies. In an environment where most
Asian economies, especially Korea, benefited from currency
depreciation in weathering the negative impact of the global
crisis, Japan had to assume more than its share of the
adjustment burden.
The propensity of most Asian economies to manage exchange
rates, especially when their currencies were under appreciation
pressure, meant that they accumulated large balances of foreign
exchange reserves. The accumulation of foreign exchange
reserves not only was an insurance against a sudden reversal of
capital inflows but may also have allowed these countries to
achieve some degree of monetary independence and exchange
rate stability while they moved toward greater capital account
openness (Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito 2009; Kim and Yang 2009).
Reserve accumulation may have thus served useful purposes
from the point of view of individual countries. From a more
global standpoint, however, the outcome was costly. It allowed
large US current account deficits to be financed at low cost and
contributed to the global imbalance, the unwinding of which was in part a triggering cause of the global financial crisis. These
considerations suggest that the choice of exchange rate policy by
one economy could have regional and global implications,
making it a subject for useful cooperative discussion.
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The views expressed in this paper are the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), its Board of Directors, or the governments they represent. ADBI does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this paper and accepts no responsibility for any consequences of their use. Terminology used may not necessarily be consistent with ADB official terms.
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