Former Dean, ADBI, 1998-2002
Dr. Yoshitomi, a distinguished economist, is presently Vice Chairman of The Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan Research Institute. He is also currently a Visiting Executive Professor at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, and Director of the US-Japanese Management Studies Center at the same university.
For much of his career, Dr. Yoshitomi worked in the Economic Planning Agency (EPA) of Japan. Having joined the EPA in 1962, he occupied various senior positions in the Agency, including that of Director General of its Economics Research Institute. He served as Advisor to the Minister of EPA in 1992.
Dr. Yoshitomi has also had extensive experience in international organizations. From 1984 to 1987, he was Director of the General Economics Branch of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris. Prior to that, from 1970 to 1974, he was on the staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Washington, D.C. He has also taught at the United Nations Asian Institute for Economic Development and Planning in Bangkok.
Dr. Yoshitomi will take up his appointment in January 1999.
|Post-crisis Development Paradigms||This Paradigm publication synthesizes all of the ADB Institute papers, with the help of the relevant research of others. Since this theme is vast, we do not attempt to cover every aspect of the Asian paradigms but only certain key areas. |
|Reducing Currency and Maturity Mismatch||Based on ADBI's Research Paper 30, Avoiding Double Mismatches and Withstanding Regional Financial Crises: The Singapore Experience |
|Avoiding Double Mismatches and Withstanding Regional Financial Crises: The Singapore Experience||By examining Singapore's successful experience, this paper identifies policies and factors that can avoid or mitigate the borrowing dilemma of double mismatches of currency and maturity.
The authors conclude that there are common core principles that could be adopted by other emerging economies, with modifications to reflect their local context and circumstances.
Such core policies could include: (i) conservative prudential safe guards, such as higher capital adequacy ratios for banks; (ii) proper sequencing of financial development and spacing of domestic and external financial market liberalizations; and (iii) possibly a credible dichotomized financial system encouraged by reasonable fiscal incentives and management of foreign bank participation. |
|Can "Moral Hazard" Explain the Asian Crises?||The authors question the significance of the role of moral hazard
in the international financial dimension of the Asian crises. They
propose an alternative explanation using a testable model and
based on results from a qualitative questionnaire of banks.
It is more likely that herd behavior and imprudent competition for
market shares by foreign financial institutions explains most of
the overinvestment and accumulation of short-term liabilities in
the East Asian financial bubbles, particularly when the effects of
the G-7 business cycles are added.
That would suggest international lending in global financial
markets requires more policy coordination and data disclosure
among institutions and recipient and emission countries, coupled
with stronger surveillance of capital flows. |
|Designing a Financial Market Structure in Post-Crisis Asia-How to Develop Corporate Bond Markets||Since the Asian financial crisis, strong and increasingly prevalent views have emerged that banks are no more functional and that economic development should rely on capital markets. Such views claim that the Asian crisis was caused by heavy dependence of firms' investment on bank loans and that Asian commercial banks did not function as properly as those operating in some advanced countries, due to crony relations among banks, firms, and governments. These views conclude that policies should place less emphasis on bank loans and that Asian countries should develop domestic capital markets as alternative more important sources of financing. |