Internationalization of Banking: The Economic Benefits and Risks
Driven by telecommunication advances, easing of regulatory barriers, and global economic
integration, foreign banks have dramatically increased their cross-border lending to, and
investment in, developing countries. The presence of foreign banks today constitutes an
important structural feature of the banking industry in many developing countries. Foreign
ownership varies considerably. For instance, in Latin America, large economies such as
Peru and Mexico have a foreign presence accounting for 95 and 82%, respectively, of the
banking system. However, foreign ownership of the banking sector is substantially higher in
Europe and Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America than in East and South
Asia. As Table 9 [ PDF 8.8KB | 1 page ] indicates, the participation of foreign banks in East Asia is extensive only in
Indonesia.
As the recent crisis has demonstrated, foreign participation can bring benefits as well as
risks. Developing countries have reaped substantial gains through the increased availability
of finance to credit-constrained firms and households, the provision of sophisticated financial
services, and incentives for improved efficiency as domestic banks have had to compete
with foreign entrants. However, international banks can also transmit adverse financial
shocks around the globe: major banks can sharply reduce credit to developing countries due
to illiquid interbank markets, tightening credit standards, or pressure on the capital base. In
addition, the ability of foreign-owned banks to raise funding from their parent banks abroad
can fuel a domestic credit boom, potentially offsetting efforts by central banks to contain
inflationary pressures or restrict capital inflows.
There is evidence that banking flows are increasing (Table 10 [ PDF 10.8KB | 1 page ]). Again, cross-border capital
flows can bring capital to countries, but also can exacerbate liquidity risks. Cross-border
banking flows have several implications for financial stability. The banking systems in
several emerging markets have become more dependent on foreign banks and wholesale
foreign funding. This has sometimes involved borrowing by affiliates of foreign banks from
their parents (for example, in Korea). In other cases, borrowing in wholesale markets in the
major financial centers has financed foreign currency lending to residents (for example, in
Eastern Europe).
The liquidity risks of such dependence were demonstrated when the markets became
dysfunctional in September and October 2008. It is too early to assess the impact on Asia,
although countries particularly active in international interbank markets, such as PRC, India,
Kazakhstan, and Korea, need to be concerned about the possibility that their domestic
banks will face funding difficulties in international markets, should liquidity pressures in
interbank markets remain at elevated levels. Equally, the current weakness in the balance
sheets of international banks will adversely affect major borrowers in developing countries. It
is beyond the scope of this article to recommend policy measures for addressing the
presence of foreign banks, but the changes in the nature and character of international credit
intermediation are likely to endure, and emerging markets need to explore policies to
address the presence of foreign banks in domestic markets. The process, however, needs to
be managed carefully because the presence of international banks also presents potential
risks. Efforts to reap the benefits of foreign bank presence while controlling risks could focus
on vetting the soundness of entering banks as well as "ring fencing" them.
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The views expressed in this paper are the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), its Board of Directors, or the governments they represent. ADBI does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this paper and accepts no responsibility for any consequences of their use. Terminology used may not necessarily be consistent with ADB official terms.
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