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Endnotes1The reduction will be permanent as long as the income increases are not reversed. Reversal is unlikely, but not impossible, especially in the current global credit crises. 2The additional cost per child educated is the present value cost of the education target divided by the increase in the annual number of children educated. One can also measure the increase in cost divided by the total number of children educated in the period 2000–2015. By that measure the additional cost is between US$2 and US$6. Likewise the additional cost per child reduction who survives beyond 5 years of age is the present value cost of the mortality target divided by the decline in the number of child deaths in 2015 compared to 2000. One can also measure the increase in cost divided by the reduction in the total number of deaths in the period 2000–2015. By that measure the additional cost is between US$9 and US$12. Note also that we do not have an estimate of the unit cost for maternal mortality or decline in other disease. This is because of a lack of either a both baseline or predicted 2015 values for maternal mortality, HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases. 3For details, visit http://www.who.int/quantifying_ehimpacts/global/en/dalys.pdf (accessed 27 October 2009). 4It can be argued that in fact these subsidies are not always necessary and that they are provided to attract farmers to the program. It would be less expensive to set up a revolving fund to purchase inputs and distribute them to farmers at the beginning of the planting season. The fund would be reimbursed when the farmers sold their produce. In this case the input subsidy would be the interest cost of the fund. 5It is worth nothing that the transition cost for farmers converting from chemical to organic farming is higher than those converting to Good Agricultural Practice farming, which is de facto largely organic. 6Large-scale in this case does not refer to mono-crop large-scale farming but village or countywide conversion of collective numbers of smallholder farmers. 7This approximation overestimates the number of very poor households, as almost certainly the underlying distribution will be closer to a log-normal. This cannot be estimated as we do not have data on the parameters of that distribution. Since the error in taking a rectangular distribution is to underestimate the numbers taken out of poverty, we can say that our figures were conservative estimates of the gains in poverty reduction. 8We should be particularly careful of the estimates for Thailand, where the gains in net income showed a very wide range. As noted in the Synthesis chapter of Setboonsarng and Markandya (2009), these are probably due to special conditions in the market in 2005, when conventional farmers were offered higher than market prices. Download this Paper [ PDF 195.5KB| 25 pages ]. [previous chapter]
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