Endnotes

¹Eichengreen (2009).

²For example Truman (2008), IMF (2008a, 2008b), Bryant (2008), Cooper and Truman (2007), and Dervis and Ozer (2005). A wider range of studies on structural issues and reform is collected in Truman (2006).

³Thus, when the current crisis began, Korea and Singapore turned to ad hoc bilateral currency swaps with the US Federal Reserve System instead of loans from the IMF.

⁴See IMF, “Bolstering the IMF's Lending Capacity” (last updated 28 May 2010). http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/faq/contribution.htm

⁵The G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors was established in December 1999 to bring together systemically important industrialized and developing economies. In November 2008, leaders of the G20 countries met for the first time in Washington, DC to initiate the G20 summit process. The members of the G20 are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, PRC, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union.

⁶The members of the Basel Committee are: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.

⁷The members of the FSB are: Argentina; Australia; Canada, China, Brazil, France, Germany, Hong Kong, China; India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union.

⁸An overview of the IMF's current (and rapidly changing) lending facilities is provided by the “Factsheet: IMF Lending” which can be found online at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/howlend.htm.

⁹The World Bank Group comprises the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).

¹⁰To streamline the poverty reduction work, the World Bank may consider taking over the IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and integrating it with its own Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC).

¹¹The following general capital increases have been made: AfDB 200%; ADB 200%; IDB 70%; EBRD 50%; and IBRD of the World Bank Group 30% and IFC US$200 million.

¹²One of the functions of the WTO is to monitor the world trading system—including trade policy reviews to monitor compliance with WTO obligations.

¹³The US has highly fragmented supervisory systems for commercial banks, a very weak supervisory framework over investment banks and security houses, and state-by-state regulation over insurance companies.

¹⁴These issues are worked out in greater detail in Kawai, Petri and Sisli-Ciamarra (2010).

¹⁵See Sandler and Tschirhart (1980) for a comprehensive survey. Seminal contributions were made by Buchanan (1965) and Olson (1965).

¹⁶The IMF's Board of Governors conducts general quota reviews every five years. Any proposed changes in quotas must be approved by an 85% majority.

¹⁷This principle argues that there should be proper division of labor among national, regional and global institutions in providing public goods. Decisions should be made at the lowest possible administrative level that spans the benefits derived from a particular public good. For example, an Asian road network would be financed by the Asian Development Bank rather than the World Bank.

¹⁸The Meltzer Report (2000) also envisioned limiting the World Bank's role to these intrinsically global public goods. However, that report saw little need for development lending beyond such public goods. In this paper, we would leave such decisions to groups of countries. They could interpret public goods differently and support projects that would not be funded by a universal membership.

¹⁹See Kawai and Wignaraja (2010).

²⁰This was proposed by the Asian Development Bank (2008).

²¹Since many Asian economies are unwilling to enter IMF programs, the CMIM's IMF link will need to be eventually phased out. This together with a strong secretariat will transform the CMIM into an independent AMF. Then a model for IMF-AMF collaboration could be developed in line with IMF-EU collaboration.

²²In the area of infrastructure development, a Pan-Asian infrastructure forum and an Asian infrastructure investment fund could be established. See ADB-ADBI (2009) for details.

²³The EMEAP is a completely separate process from the ASEAN+3 finance ministers' process. Its membership includes central banks of: Australia, PRC; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; Korea; Malaysia; New Zealand; Philippines; Singapore; and Thailand.

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Comment(s)

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1. Sritanu Chatterjee
   (posted 12 August 2010 / 12:31:26 PM)
   
   Dear Sir,
   
   The suggestions put forward in the paper are quite pertinent in today's scenario. In a multipolar world, regional institutions will have much bigger and responsible role to play.The paper would be more interesting if the shortcomings or problems of having too many regional institutions had been mentioned. Decentralisation leads to many benefit - increasing bureaucratic efficiency, localisation of knowledge base and global institutions gaining more confidence while taking decisions. But the problem lies in the implementation of the idea. In India, decentralisation or "panchyati raj" started in 1980s. But very few states have been able to implement it properly till date. For some states, it has aggravated the problems. Therefore, I think if more intense thought is given on the idea of implementation then it would expedite the process of formation of regional institutions.
   
   Thanks & Regards,
   Sritanu